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Some Observations on the Disposition of CCW Cases in 
Detroit 
Recent years have witnessed an alarming increase in the number 
of crimes involving firearms committed in Detroit1 and other large 
metropolitan areas.2 In response to this increase and to studies in-
dicating a significant relationship between firearm availability and 
the rate of firearm-related felonies,3 many commentators have made 
proposals to augment or alter current gun control legislation."' Typi-
cal of the current legislation is the Michigan scheme, which requires 
a license to purchase a firearm5 and a license to carry a concealed 
weapon.6 
Realizing that no gun control statute can deter the commission 
of firearm-related felonies unless adequately enforced, the author of 
this Note undertook a study of the enforcement in Detroit's record-
er's court7 of the Michigan carrying concealed weapons (CCW) stat-
ute. 8 The CCW statute was passed by the Michigan legislature in 
1. See, e.g., RECORDERS COURT OF THE CITY OF DETROIT, MICHIGAN, ANNUAL 
REPORT (1960-1974) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT]; Edwards, Commentary: Murder 
and Gun Control, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1335, 1341 (1972). 
2. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMN. ON THE CAUSES & PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, 
CruMEs OF VIOLENCE apps. 5 & 6 (1969); NATIONAL COMMN. ON THE CAUSES & 
PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, To EsTABLISH JUSTICE, To INSURE DOMESTIC ThANQUILin' 
xiv, 184-85 (1967) [hereinafter To EsTABLISH JUSTICE]. 
3. See, e.g., To EsTABLISH JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 169-75; Zimring, Is Gun 
Control Likely To Reduce Violent Killing?, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 721 (1968). 
4. See, e.g., To EsTABLISH JUSTICE, supra note 2, at xviii-xix. 
5. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 28.422 (Supp. 1975). An applicant for a license 
must be at least 18 years of age, a citizen of the United States, a resident of the state 
of Michigan for 6 months or more, a nonfelon, and legally sane. 
6. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 28.426 (Supp. 1975). In addition to meeting the 
requirements for a license to purchase, see note 5 supra, an applicant for a license to 
carry a concealed weapon must demonstrate reasonable need. 
Enforcement of the licensing provisions is regulated by MICH. CoMP, LAws ANN. 
§ 750.227 (Supp. 1975) (carrying a concealed weapon declared a felony, see note 8 
infra); MICH. COMP. LAws § 750.92 (1970) (attempt to commit crime punishable by 
five-years imprisonment declared a felony); MICH. COMP, LAws §§ 750.228, .232a, 
.237 (1970) (miscellaneous firearm misdemeanors). In addition, the City of Detroit 
provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to transport or to have in possession in 
or upon any vehicle a firearm unless the same is unloaded in both barrel and 
magazine and carried in the luggage compartment of the vehicle. It shall be unlawful 
to carry a firearm on any public street or in any public place unless it is unloaded and 
in a case." CODE OF THE CITY OF DETROIT§ 66-4-2 (1973). 
7. The Detroit recorder's court has jurisdiction over all proceedings for crimes 
committed within the city of Detroit. MICH. COMP. LAws § 726.11 (1970). 
8. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.227 (Supp. 1975): 
A person who shall carry a dagger, dirk, stiletto, or other dangerous weapon ex-
cept hunting knives adapted and carried as such, concealed on or about his per-
son, or whether concealed or otherwise in any vehicle operated or occupied by 
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order to discourage the carrying of firearms in situations where they 
might be used to commit serious crimes.9 This study was aimed at 
determining whether the judges of the Detroit recorder's court deal 
with CCW cases and offenders in a manner likely to accomplish that 
statutory purpose. 
The results of the study, set forth in this Note, reveal that the 
members of the bench of the Detroit recorder's court view CCW as 
a minor, relatively inoffensive crime. They devote comparatively 
few of their limited judicial resources to CCW cases and deal with 
offenders leniently. Thus, of those individuals initially charged with 
CCW, a relatively low proportion are convicted of the offense or a 
lesser offense;10 of those convicted, very few receive prison sen-
tences even though the offense carries a five-year maximum sen-
tence and many of the offenders have prior felony records.11 When 
considered in light of recent studies on deterrence, the results of this 
study suggest that efforts at countering the increase in firearm-re-
lated felonies might beneficially be directed toward punishing viola-
tors of existing legislation with greater regularity. 
Part I of this Note details the disposition of cases alleging viola-
tions of the Michigan CCW statute that were brought in the Detroit 
recorder's court during 1973. Although the statute is only part of 
the current scheme of gun control in Michigan, it is the principal 
weapon available to the police and prosecutor in the preventive bat-
tle against the illegal use of firearms.12 To give meaning to the dis-
positional statistics and to aid in perceiving the over-all judicial atti-
tude toward CCW cases, the statistical results of the study are com-
pared with statistics on the disposition of cases involving felonies 
similar in nature or maximum sentence. Part II considers whether 
the current enforcement scheme is adequate in light of accepted de-
terrence theories and concludes that a significant increase in the cer-
tainty and severity of punishment of offenders is necessary if the 
CCW statute is to operate with any degree of effectiveness. Part 
him, except in his dwelling house or place of business or on other land possessed 
by him; and a person who shall carry a pistol concealed on or about his person, 
or, whether concealed or otherwise, in a vehicle operated or occupied by him, 
except in his dwelling house or place of business or on other land possessed by 
him, without a license to carry the pistol as provided by law, or if licensed, car-
rying in a place or manner inconsistent with any restrictions upon such license, 
shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for 
not more than 5 years, or by fine of not more than $2,500.00. 
9. See People v. Bailey, 10 Mich. App. 636, 639-40, 160 N.W.2d 380, 382 (1968). 
10. See TABLE 3 infra. 
11. See TABLES 5 & 6 infra. 
12. Interview with Terrance Boyle, Managing Prosecutor for the Wayne County 
Prosecutor, in Detroit, Aug. 1974 [hereinafter Boyle Interview]. More warrants are 
issued for CCW offenses in recorder's court than for any other felony. See A.NNuAL 
REPORT, supra note 1, at 9 (1973). 
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ill suggests a sentencing scheme that is more likely to satisfy the 
purpose of the CCW statute. 
I. ToE FINDINGS 
The data for this study, gathered during the summer of 1974,13 
were compiled by examining CCW cases initiated in Detroit in 
1973.14 Because all CCW cases are begun by a prosecution request 
for an arrest warrant, 15 it was possible to amass a complete list of 
all CCW cases from the daily reports of the warrants division. Every 
fourth case was selected until the sample size reached 475, 11 of 
which were dropped because the files could not be located.10 In-
formation was gathered from the files, where available and rele-
vant, 17 on all aspects of the criminal proceedings: initial ap-
pearance, probable-cause examination, plea negotiation, disposition 
13. The author participated in the Wayne County Prosecutor's Summer Intern 
Program. This study was conducted at the request of Prosecutor William Cahalen 
and was funded through the intern program and by a special consultant grant. 
14. Some CCW offenders are charged under CoDE OF THE CrrY OF DETROIT § 66-
4-2 (1973 ), or under one of the miscellaneous firearm misdemeanor provisions, MICH, 
COMP. LAws §§ 750.228 (safety inspection), .232a (purchasing without a license), 
.237 (use of firearm under the influence of alcohol) (1970), rather than under the 
felony statute, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.227 (Supp. 1975). The arresting 
officer seems to make the decision regarding which provision to use, This study does 
not include any misdemeanor or ordinance violation cases. 
-15. The procedure that must be followed by Michigan courts in processing 
criminal complaints is set out in MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 760.1-776.658 (1970), 
as amended, (Supp. 1975). Most prosecutions for CCW in recorder's court begin 
when the suspect is apprehended by the police and charged. The arresting officer 
swears out an affidavit stating the facts that underlie the alleged offense. See MICH, 
COMP. LAws § 767.1 (1970). The Warrants Division of the Wayne County 
Prosecutor's Office determines whether or not to recommend the issuance of the 
warrant. See MICH. COMP, LAws § 764.1 (1970). The defendant is brought before 
the court for an initial appearance. Here the judge decides whether to sign the 
warrant, and bail is set where applicable. Unlike the two-tier procedure practiced in 
other jurisdictions in Michigan (district and circuit courts), in Detroit the entire case 
is disposed of in recorder's court. See MICH. COMP. LAws § 726.11 (1970). Some 
time later an examination is held where a recorder's court judge determines whether 
there is probable cause to believe that the crime was committed and the defendant 
committed it. See MICH. CoMP. LAws §§ 766.3, .13 (1970). 
16. Files on criminal proceedings in recorder's court are maintained by both the 
recorder's court clerk and the prosecutor's office. The recorder's court files are 
usually complete, except for the defendant's criminal history and the prosecutor's 
records of plea negotiation. If a case is at trial, being reviewed by a judge, 
prosecutor, or probation official, or if the file is simply mislaid after dismissal by a 
clerk, the file is not readily accessible; such cases were therefore excluded from this 
study. It is doubtful that the absence of these cases could have significantly affected 
the results of the study. A subsequent check of the missing files revealed many 
different reasons for their absence-in fact, the only factor in common was their 
absence. 
17. Early disposition of a case will, of course, result in the elimination of later 
stages. For instance, no sentencing information will be available if the case was 
dismissed. 
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at trial, criminal history, and personal data.18 The files generally 
·provided accurate information on these items. Where gaps existed, 
the case was removed from the study unless the missing data could 
reasonably be supplied in light of the circumstances.19 
The study is limited to cases where the defendant was charged 
in the warrant and information with the felony of carrying a con-
cealed weapon. There are situations, however, where either the of-
ficer in the street or the prosecutor in the warrants division decides 
that criminal sanctions are inappropriate in the particular case and 
thus fails to initiate a prosecution. In such cases the weapon is usu-
ally confiscated and the offender released.20 These cases generally 
are not reported and their incidence remains unknown. The cases 
actually commenced are examined in this Note at each of the major 
stages of the criminal proceeding, with particular attention given to 
explaining why cases are dismissed at each stage. Although under-
standing why the CCW statute is being enforced at the present level 
is unnecessary for determining whether that level is. adequate to de-
ter potential offenders, it is essential in order to prevent any new 
scheme of enforcement from being circumvented. The following 
discussion critiques the disposition of the CCW cases as they flowed 
through recorder's court. . 
In 9.3 per cent of all the CCW cases, the defendant was allowed 
18. TABLE: PERSONAL DATA ON 464 CCW DEFENDANTS 
Age Percentage Number of cases 
Under 21 12.9 60 
21-24 21.9 102 
25-29 23.0 107 
30-39 22.8 106 
40-49 11.6 54 
Over 50 1.5 35 
Sex 
Male 89.4 415 
Female 10.6 49 
Race 
Black 88.7 412 
White 11.3 52 
19. For example, if there was no record of a probable cause hearing, but the file 
shows that an initial appearance and trial took place on different dates, it was 
reasonable to assume that the defendant was bound over after a waiver of the 
preliminary hearing. 
20. Although the Detroit Police Department does not readily admit to 1his 
practice, it is a well-known police procedure. Boyle Interview, supra note 12. CODE 
OF nm CITY OF DETROIT§ 66-4-5 (1973) specifically provides: "It shall be the duty 
of any police officer of the city to arrest any person found violating [CODE OF nm . 
CITY OF DETROIT § 66-4-2 (1973) (set out in note 6 supra)] •••• " (Emphasis 
added.) 
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to plead guilty to a lesser offense at the initial appearance. 21 In all 
of these cases, the prosecutor was either absent or objected. In over 
half of these cases (56 per cent), the judge at the initial appearance 
allowed the defendant charged with CCW to plead guilty to a mis-
demeanor. In dismissing CCW charges in this manner, judges as-
sume control over the executive task of instituting and controlling 
prosecutions without authority to do so and in direct violation of the 
Michigan supreme court's decision in Genesee Prosecutor v. Gene-
see Circuit Judge (Genesee I).22 
In Genesee I, the court concluded that it was improper for a trial 
judge to determine under which of two applicable statutes a prosecu-
tion should be instituted. In particular, the court held that a trial 
judge abused his discretion by allowing a defendant charged with 
possession of a stolen vehicle to plead guilty, over the prosecutor's 
objection, to the crime of unlawfully driving away an automobile.28 
This holding was expanded in Genesee II, 24 where the court con-
cluded that it was improper for a trial judge to allow a defendant 
to plead guilty at trial to a lesser included offense over the prosecu-
:tor's objection. Taken together, Genesee I & II evidence a trend 
by the Michigan supreme court to restrict the discretion of trial 
judges to reduce charges that, while supported by sufficient evi-
dence, seem unduly harsh. Genesee II was decided after the final 
disposition of most of the cases in this study. Accordingly, the study 
does not indicate whether that decision is being followed in CCW 
cases by members of the Detroit recorder's court bench. 
In addition to disregarding Genesee I, this behavior by judges 
at initial appearances may be in violation of Michigan General Court 
Rule 785.7(2), which requires that, if there is a plea agreement, 
it must be acknowledged on the record by the defendant, his coun-
s'el, and the prosecutor. 25 Indeed, the Michigan court rules explic-
21. Applications for bond were also handled at the initial appearance: 
TABLE: REsULTS OF BOND .APPLICATIONS OF 464 
CCW DEFENDANTS 
Percentage Number of Cases 
Personal bond 69.6 323 
Surety bond 
$500 or less 12.0 56 
Over $500 13.5 63 
Cash bond 1.6 7 
Case dismissed 3.3 15 
22. 386 Mich. 672, 194 N.W.2d 693 (1972). 
23. 386 Mich. at 683-84, 194 N.W.2d at 699. 
24. Genesee Prosecutor v. Genesee Circuit Judge, 391 Mich. 115, 215 N.W.2d 
145 (1974). 
25. See People v. Leonard, 51 Mich. App. 368, 370-71, 214 N.W.2d 888, 889 
(1974). Cf. Genesee Prosecutor v. Genesee Circuit Judge, 391 Mich. 115, 122, 215 
N.W.2d 145, 148 (1974). 
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itly state that plea agreements are void and subject to mandatory re-
versal unless acknowledged by the prosecutor.26 
These initial-appearance statistics evidence an inclination on be-
half of the Michigan judiciary to dispose of CCW cases in a summary 
-and lenient fashion. This inclination, which as the statistics pre-
sented below make clear is apparent throughout the various stages 
of the criminal process, perhaps stems from a pervasive view of 
CCW as somehow a "different" or less offensive type of crime. Car-
rying a concealed weapon without a license cannot be placed into 
either of the traditional criminal law categories-crime against the 
person or crime against property-because the crime has no immedi-
ate, identifiable, victim. Rather, akin to many narcotics offenses, 
it is a possessory crime enacted by the legislature out of fear of the 
possible consequences of the activity. For this reason, it is quite 
possible that judges inight personally view CCW as a less serious 
crime than felonies having identifiable victims, 27 a view that may en-
ter into their disposition of CCW cases. Judicial leniency may also 
stem from a vague notion that an individual's right to bear arms 
somehow affects the seriousness of the act of carrying a concealed 
weapon without a license. 
TABLE 1 
RESULTS OF PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS OF 
464 CCW DEFENDANTS 
Percentage Number of Cases 
Examination held, 
defendant bound over 42.2 196 
Examination waived, 
defendant bound over 25.6 119 
Case dismissed 
Insufficient evidence 11.6 54 
Illegal search and seizure 7.3 34 
Lack of jurisdiction 0.6 3 
Failure of witness to appear 1.5 7 
Capias 1.9 9 
No record of examination 9.3 . 42 
Twenty-one per cent of the CCW cases were dismissed at the 
second stage of the criminal process, the preliminary examination: 
11.6 per cent for insufficient evidence, 7.3 per cent for illegal 
search and seizure,28 1.5 per cent because the complaining witness . 
26. MICH. GEN. Cr. R. 785.7(5). 
27. See New York Commn. of Investigation, Report Concerning the Availability, 
Illegal Possession, and Use of Handguns in New York State 40 (Oct. 17, 1974). 
28. Dismissals for insufficient evidence and for illegal search and seizure can be 
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failed to appear, and .6 per cent because the court lacked jurisdic-
tion. By way of comparison, 16.75 per cent of all other felony cases 
during the same period were dismissed at this stage. 20 
A number of possible ·explanations exist for the higher dismissal 
rate for CCW cases at preliminary examinations. Negligent or in-
tentional misconduct on the part of the police during the initial in-
vestigation or search30 and judicial suspicion that the prosecution's 
testimonial evidence of probable cause is perjured31 account for 
most illegal search and seizure and insufficient evidence dismissals. 
These reasons for dismissal are clearly valid. But the complicated 
nature of the search and seizure questions that so commonly arise 
in CCW cases affords the examining judge a great deal of discretion 
in deciding whether to bind the case over for trial. It is not clear 
that this discretion is being exercised in a manner consistent with 
the manifest state goal of reducing the incidence of firearm-related 
felonies. 
A study conducted by the Wayne County Prosecutor in February 
and March of 1974 comparing the reasons given for the dismissal 
of CCW and narcotic cases indicates that the high dismissal rate for 
CCW cases is not caused primarily by a higher incidence of truly 
illegal searches and seizures. Both CCW and narcotics offenses are 
by their nature possessory, and it is reasonable to assume that dis-
missal rates for illegal search and seizure should be about the same 
for both. The statistics indicated, however, that this was not the 
case. Nearly 85 per cent of the CCW dismissals were for illegal 
analyzed together since there is no apparent difference in what is meant by the two 
terms. See Boyle Interview, supra note 12. Either phrase is appropriate where the 
evidence is excluded because the police officer either conducted an improper search or 
lacked probable cause to search at all. The prosecutor's office treats these categories 
alike and notes on each file, "The Assistant Prosecuting Attorney does not necessarily 
agree with the ruling of the court: however, most cases are discretionary and not 
appealable." 
29. See AmrnAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 10 (1973). 
30. Constitutional questions concerning the propriety of searches and seizures 
arise during CCW prosecutions due to the possessory nature of the offense. The 
CCW statute requires that the weapon be "concealed," but it need not be completely 
hidden. It is sufficient if it is not readily observable by a person in the ordinary and 
usual associations of life. Therefore, detection of an offender can occur only when 
the weapon is observed by the officer or witness in the ordinary course of affairs or 
discovered incident to a lawful search based on probable cause. In the complex area 
of search and seizure, good faith errors on the part of the police are not uncommon. 
See, e.g., Chevigny, Police Abuses in Connection with the Law of Search and Seizure, 
5 CruM. L. BULL. 3 (1969); LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: 
Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 61 MICH. L. RBv. 40 (1968); LaFave, Search and 
Seizure: The Course of True Law ••• Has Not ••• Run Smooth, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 
255. 
31. Even in cases of legitimate police error, the officer may not want to admit his 
mistake, and police testimony may be tailored to conform with well-established legal 
standards. See, e.g., People v. Berrios, 28 N.Y.2d 361, 270 N.E.2d 709, 321 N.Y.S.2d 
884 (1971). 
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search and seizure, 32 as compared to only 57 per cent of the nar-
cotics dismissals.33 Moreover, a month-long study of "arbitrary dis-
missals," conducted by the Wayne County Prosecutor in November 
1974, revealed that 10 of the 14 dismissals deemed arbitrary were 
CCW cases. 34 
These high dismissal-rate statistics suggest that the recorder's 
court bench views CCW violations as insufficiently serious to warrant 
the expenditure of valuable judicial time to unravel the complex 
fourth amendment issues often raised. Yet it is the role of the 
judges to decide the controversies brought before them. The dis-
missal of cases to avoid deciding complex issues can only be viewed 
as an abusive abdication of that role. 
Many of the CCW dismissals might be attributed to a "docket 
clearing'' program conducted by ,the recorder's court bench in an ef-
fort to reduce case loads to more manageable levels. 35 Such dis-
missals frustrate the efforts of police and prosecutors, detract from 
the deterrent effect of the criminal statutes, and evidence a · clear 
need for additional judges and courtrooms to handle the continually 
increasing case loads. Perhaps more importantly, such dismissals 
suggest that programs to increase ~e number of CCW offenders ap-
prehended will not necessarily serve the ends of justice without a 
concurrent increase in the number of judges or a shift in the attitude 
of judges to viewing CCW as indeed a serious offense. 
The stage of the criminal proceedings between the preliminary 
examination and the trial is the plea negotiation stage.36 
32. Ninety-eight cases were dismissed at the preliminary examination; of these, 88 
were dismissed because of insufficient evidence or illegal search and seizure. See 
TABLE 1 supra; note 28 supra. 
33. Internal files of the Wayne County Prosecutor, Preliminary Examination 
Department, Feb. and March 1974. 
34. Internal files of the Wayne County Prosecutor, Preliminary Examination 
Department, Nov. 1974. 
35. Although the court's role at the preliminary hearing is simply to determine 
whether sufficient probable cause exists to bind over the accused, see MICH. COMP. 
LAws §§ 766.3, .13 (1970), both societal interests in judicial economy and fundamen-
tal fairness to defendants require that the court keep its dockets running smoothly. 
See, e.g., ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS 
RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUIL'IY 37-40 (1968); Enker, Perspectives on Plea Bargain-
ing, in U.S. TASK FORCE ON TIIE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE PREsIDENTS 
COMMN. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE 
REPORT: THE COURTS app. A, at 112-14 (1967). In order to maintain the number of 
felony trials at a level where these goals can be achieved, many cases must be 
disposed of either by dismissal at examination or by plea negotiation before trial. 
36. Statistics for this stage are more uncertain than for other stages. Plea 
negotiation continues throughout the trial process, and records are often incomplete. 
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TABLE 2 
RESULTS OF PLEA NEGOTIATIONS FOR 357 CCW DEFENDANTS 
WHOSE CASES HAD NOT BEEN DISMISSED AFTER 
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION 
Plea to lesser charge offered by 
prosecutor 
Percentage Number of Cases 
Attempted CCW (felony) 59.3 212 
Misdemeanor 
Failure to present for 
safety inspection 2.0 7 
Disorderly conduct 0.5 2 
Possession of gun without 
a license 0.5 2 
No reduced plea offered 8.7 31 
Case dismissed 0.8 3 
No record of plea negotiation 28.0 100 
As a general policy, the Wayne County Prosecutor allows those 
bound over for trial on CCW charges (a felony with a 5-year maxi-
mum sentence) to plead guilty to attempted CCW (a felony with 
a 2½-year maximum sentence).37 In the cases studied, 59.3 per 
cent of those bound over were offered attempted CCW by the prose-
cutor. Over three quarters of these (78.3 per cent, or 46.8 per cent 
of those bound over) accepted the offer. In 8.7 per cent of the 
cases, the prosecutor insisted on bringing the original charge. Gen-
erally, these were cases in which either the defendant insisted upon 
vindicating himself completely or the prosecutor felt that the defend-
ant, because of his circumstances, should be prosecuted to the fullest 
extent of the law. In 3 per cent of the cases, the defendants were 
offered misdemeanors, 38 and in 0.8 per cent of the cases, the charges 
were dismissed at this stage.39 The remaining cases (28 per cent) 
showed no record of the plea negotiation stage. 40 
The general prosecutorial policy of offering a reduced charge in 
exchange for a guilty plea stems from the inability of the prosecutor's 
37. MICH. CoMP. LAws § 750.92 (1970), construed in [1939-1940] OP. MICH. 
AITY.GEN.57. 
38. Of those defendants offered a misdemeanor, 81 per cent pleaded guilty with 
two thirds of those receiving probation and/or fine and one third receiving suspended 
sentences. Over half of the guilty misdemeanor defendants had prior criminal 
records, including one third who had prior felony records. Charged with a misde-
meanor, the defendant faces only a one-year maximum sentence and avoids the 
classification of "felon." 
39. Dismissals at the plea negotiation stage are usually given as part of a larger 
bargain or entered because the defendant has died, the court lacks jurisdiction, or the 
"ends of justice have been met." 
40. It is not clear why such a substantial number of cases show no record of plea 
negotiation. In over half of the cases, earlier guilty pleas at the initial appearance or 
preliminary examination or a capias may explain the absence of plea negotiation. In 
the remaining cases, it is possible that a conference was held, but no record kept. 
These cases are not lost to the remainder of the study and affect only this part of the 
data. 
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small staff to try more than a small fraction of the total cases. The 
practice of offering attempted CCW to those charged with CCW is 
particularly common because both crimes are felonies and because, 
as discussed below, the recorder's court bench rarely imposes a 
prison term on those convicted of either of the offenses. 41 Thus, 
the prosecutor saves judicial resources without making substantial 
concessions. 
In light of current sentencing patterns, there is little reason to 
criticize the prosecutorial policy of routinely ·allowing defendants 
originally charged with CCW to plead guilty to attempted CCW. 
Grounds for criticism would arise, however, if a higher sentence or 
a mandatory minimum sentence were imposed in CCW cases and 
prosecutorial plea bargaining significantly detracted from the deter-
rent effect of the CCW statute. 
Slightly over one fourth of the cases in the study were dismissed 
either before or during the plea negotiation stage. 42 Those that 
were not dismissed, including those in which a guilty plea was of-
fered, reached what may be called the trial stage. Of the defendants 
reaching the trial stage, approximately 68 per cent pleaded or were 
found guilty and 7.5 per cent were found not guilty.43 Approxi-
mately 24 per cent of the cases reaching the trial stage were dis-
missed. 
TABLE 3 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL FOR 348 CCW DEFENDANTS 
BROUGHT TO TRIAL 
Percentage Number of Cases 
Conviction 
ccw 2.9 10 
Attempted CCW 53.8 187 
Misdemeanors 
Failure to present for 
safety inspection 5.2 18 
Disorderly conduct 4.6 16 
Possession of gun without 
a license 0.3 1 
Acquittal 7.5 26 
Dismissal 23.8 83 
No record available 2.0 7 
41. See TABLE 5 infra. However, higher sentences seem to be given for CCW 
than for attempted CCW. See text at note 52 infra. 
42. This group includes those cases that were disposed of by plea at the initial 
appearance. 
43. Of the 275 defendants whose cases were not dismissed at trial, 230 (83.6 per 
cent) pleaded guilty, 23 (8.3 per cent) had a bench trial, 8 (3.0 per cent) had a 
jury trial, 6 (2.1 per cent) did not appear, and records were not available for 8 (3.0 
percent). 
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A total of only 2.9 per cent of all cases reaching the trial level 
(10 cases of the beginning 464) resulted in a conviction on the orig-
inal CCW charge. Convictions for attempted CCW were obtained 
in 53.8 per cent of the cases (187 cases), while misdemeanor con-
victions accounted for 10.1 per cent of all trial dispositions (35 
cases). 
A variety of explanations were given for the dismissals at the trial 
stage. 
TABLE 4 
REASONS FOR DISMISSALS OF 83 CCW CASES AT TRIAL 
Motion of prosecutor 
illegal search and seizure 
Insufficient evidence 
Lack of jurisdiction 
Failure of witness to appear 
"Ends of justice met" 
Death of defendant 
Plea in another case 
Sentenced on another charge 
Other 





















illegal search and seizure and insufficient evidence were the reasons 
for over half of the dismissals. 44 As at earlier stages, this high dis-
missal rate at trial suggests that the judges are dismissing CCW cases 
that raise complex issues in order to devote more of their time to 
more serious criminal violations. And again, the result presumably 
is that the deterrent effect of the CCW statute is thereby lessened. 
Eleven of the cases reaching the trial stage were terminated out of 
necessity, because the defendant died, the court lacked jurisdiction, 
or the complaining witness failed to appear. 45 
Eleven more cases were dismissed because the defendant agreed 
to plead guilty to another criminal charge or because the defendant 
was recently sentenced for an unrelated conviction. This last group 
of dismissals makes good judicial sense. Because any sentence re-
ceived for the CCW violation would be served concurrently with the 
other sentence, 46 it ,would generally be an unnecessary duplication 
44. The appropriate time to raise such a claim is either at the preliminary 
examination or in a motion to suppress made prior to trial. Trial strategy, including 
unwillingness to disclose defense theories before trial and knowledge about different 
judges' attitudes toward gun control, might well lead a defendant to wait until trial to 
raise an illegal search claim. 
45. Responsibility for the final group must rest with the police, since the 
complaining witnesses in CCW cases are generally police officers. 
46. See People v. Clark, 43 Mich. App. 476, 479, 204 N.W.2d 332, 334 (1972): 
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of judicial expense to expend resources to obtain a conviction on the 
CCWcharge. 
Seven of the cases were dismissed because the "ends of justice 
[were] met" without proceeding any further in the case. These 
cases were dismissed because the trial judge, in his discretion, de-
cided there no longer was any reason to prosecute the offender. A 
wide variety of cases dismissed under this heading are so designated 
for lack of any other appropriate explanation. Most, presumably, 
are cases involving defendants not considered dangerous in which 
the judge concludes that the threat of prosecution, coupled with forc-
ing the defendant through the initial stages of the criminal process, 
is sufficient punishment. 
In 232 of the 464 cases, the defendant either pleaded or was 
found guilty.47 The over-all sentencing pattern48 for these cases was 
as follows: 9.9 per cent jail or prison only; 2.1 per cent jail or prison 
and probation; 6.0 per cent jail or prison, probation, and fine; 50.0 
per cent probation and fine; 15.0 per cent probation only; 7.0 per 
cent fine only; 9.1 per cent suspended sentence; and 0.9 per cent 
capias (failed to appear for sentencing, bench warrant issued). In 
short, a total of 18.0 per cent of those convicted were sentenced to 
some form of confinement, while the remainder either received pro-
bation and/ or a fine, or a suspended sentence. 
TABLE 5 
SENTENCES GIVEN TO 232 GUILTY CCW DEFENDANTS 
TYPE OF SENTENCE 
Percentage Number of Cases 
Jail or prison only 
Jail or prison and probation 
Jail or prison, probation, 
and fine 





















"In Michigan all sentences run concurrently in the absence of a statute otherwise 
providing. . . . Accordingly, after a defendant has pied guilty to one of several 
multiple charges pending against him, prosecutors generally dismiss the other charges 
after the defendant has been sentenced." 
47. See TABLE 3 supra. 
48. This pattern does not separate the cases according to the particular crime 
involved for each defendant. 
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SEVERITY OF SENTENCE 
Number of Cases 
Length of incarceration 42 total 
Less than or equal to 90 days 13 
90 days to 6 months 7 
6 months to 1 year 4 
More than 1 year 18 
Length of probation 170 total 
Less than or equal to 1 year 77 
More than 1 year 92 
No record available 1 
Amount of fine 146 total 
Less ,than or equal to $100 46 
$100to $250 50 
$250 to $500 50 
Among felonies carrying a 5-year maximum sentence, the inci-
dence of incarceration during the period studied was lowest for CCW 
violations. 49 Convictions for receiving stolen property resulted in 
prison or jail sentences in 33.9 per cent of the cases, while in cases 
of larceny over $100, 34.5 per cent of the convicted defendants were 
imprisoned. 50 
Not only was the imposition of incarceration relatively infre-
quent, but, when the sentence was a jail or prison term, the pre-
scribed period was usually quite short. Only 7 .2 per cent of all con-
victed defendants (18 total) were sentenced to a prison term ex-
ceeding 1 year, while 4. 7 per cent (11 total) received between 3 
months and 1 year and 5.5 per cent (13 total), less than 90 days.«a 
This sentencing pattern seems particularly lenient in light of the fact 
that fewer than half of those convicted were first offenders, while 
over 36 per cent had prior felony records. 
49. See State of Michigan Dept. of Corrections, Criminal Statistics 4-7 (1973) 
[hereinafter Criminal Statistics]. The statistics presented here are for the entire 
state. There is no reason to suspect that there would be a significant difference 
between the state statistics and those from Detroit. The incarceration rate for CCW 
cases for the state was 19.7 per cent. Id. at 4. The rate in Detroit was 18.0 per cent. 
See TABLE 4 supra. 
50. Criminal Statistics, supra note 49, at 4. 
51. The over-all sentencing pattern for the entire state indicates that those 
convicted for CCW outside of Detroit received longer sentences. Only 33 per cent of 
those sentenced to jail or prison in the whole state, including Detroit, received 1 year 
orless. Id. at 11. 
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TABLE 6 
PRIOR CRIMINAL RECORDS OF 232 CONVICTED 
CCW DEFENDANTS 
627 
Percentage Number of Cases 
First offender 46.1 107 
Previous misdemeanor 
Gun-related 2.1 5 
Not gun-related 12.5 29 
Previous felony 
With dangerous weapon 13.3 31 
Without dangerous weapon 16.4 38 
ccw 6.0 14 
Another felony pending 2.6 6 
No record available 0.9 2 
The leniency of the sentences imposed in the cases studied is 
illustrated by the sentencing pattern for attempted CCW, which ac-
counted for over 80 per cent of the convictions in the sample. Al-
though attempted CCW is a felony carrying a maximum sentence 
of 21/2 years, only 17.8 per cent of the guilty defendants received 
a jail or prison term, and only 6 per cent received a term equal to 
or exceeding 1 year. Over 73.6 per cent of the cases resulted in 
probation and/ or a fine only, and 4 per cent of the defendants re-
ceived a suspended sentence. Of the defendants who were sen-
tenced to probation and/ or a fine, 46.5 per cent had prior criminal 
records52 and 28.5 per cent had been previously convicted of a fel-
ony. 
Sentence leniency extended to those convicted of CCW misde-
meanors (14.4 per cent of all convictions). None of the defend-
ants convicted of a misdemeanor was incarcerated, while 29.4 per 
cent of those convicted had prior criminal records. 
There are no easily ascertainable explanations why penalties im-
posed for CCW violations are significantly milder than those imposed 
for violations of felonies carrying the same maximum sentence. Ob-
viously, the attitude of the particular judge plays an important role 
in determining the sentence in each case. Judge Colombo of the 
recorder's court bench, for example, contends that many of those ar-
rested for CCW are honest citizens resorting to a necessary means 
of self-defense and that harsh penalties are inappropriate, especially 
where the violator is a first offender.53 
52. This figure includes those defendants with another felony charge pending at 
the time of trial. 
53. Interview with Judge Robert Colombo, Judge, Recorder's Court of the City of 
Detroit, in Detroit, March 1974. The view that most first offenders should not 
receive harsh penalties is widely accepted throughout the criminal court system. It is 
felt that in most instances an individual deserves a second chance and that the high 
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Doubtless there are many individuals charged with CCW whose 
reasons for carrying a weapon are noncriminal in nature. M Sentenc-
ing based on the culpability of the offender, the criminality of the 
conduct, and the offender's prospects for rehabilitation would result 
in lenient treatment for such offenders and, in general, may explain 
the high dismissal rate and over-all sentence leniency in CCW cases. 
Yet, it must be remembered that the CCW statute was passed to de-
ter conduct that could lead to criminal actions, rather than to punish 
acts that are themselves inherently criminal. Because of this rela-
tively unusual statutory purpose, general sentencing considerations 
are less applicable in CCW cases. To comport with the predomi-
nantly deterrent function of the CCW statute, sentencing should be 
conducted to maximize the deterrence of CCW violations, and 
hence, the deterrence of firearm-related felonies. 
II. THE FINDINGS IN LIGHT OF DETERRENCE THEORY 
The dispositional statistics set forth in part I make clear that 
CCW is being treated as a low-priority offense by those who admin-
ister the criminal justice system in Detroit. It is equally clear that 
the present enforcement of the CCW statute has not decreased the 
incidence of firearm-related felonies in Detroit. 65 Between 1972 
and 1973, the homicide rate in the city of Detroit rose 11.8 per 
cent56 while the national rate increased only 4.5 per cent. 67 The 
incidence of aggravated assault increased 8.2 per cent in Wayne 
County during the same period58 compared to a 6.2 per cent rise 
nationally, 59 although the occurrence of armed robbery remained 
virtually constant for both. 60 
cost to the individual defendant as well as to society outweighs any benefit in terms 
of incapacitation or rehabilitation. See generally S. KRANTZ, THE LAW OF TIIE COR-
RECTIONS AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS 24-29 (1973). In Michigan, as in many other 
jurisdictions, provision is made for harsher sentences for repeat offenders. MICH, 
COMP. LAWS§ 769.10 (1970). See note 111 infra. 
54. The fact that so many of the individuals charged with CCW have prior 
criminal records, see TABLE 6 supra, however, suggests that Judge Colombo's view of 
CCW offenders as "honest citizens" is at. best true of only a minority of the offenders. 
55. See Edwards, supra note 1, at 1341. One 1969 study reported that Michigan 
had the fourth strictest gun control regulations in the nation. Geisel, Roll & Wettick, 
The Effectiveness of State and Local Regulations of Handguns: A Statistical Analysis, 
1969 DUKE L.J. 652-54. 
56. Detroit Police Dept., Annual Report 45 ( 1973). 
57. FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1 (1973) [hereinafter FBI CRIME REPORTS]. 
A firearm was the murder weapon in 67 per cent of these cases. Id. at 9. 
58. MICHIGAN STATE POLICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 93 ( 1973) [hereinafter 
MICHIGAN CRIME REPORTS]. 
59. FBI CRIME REPORTS, supra note 57, at 1. 
60. Compare MICHIGAN CRIME REPORTS, supra note 58, at 93, with FBI CruMn 
REPORTS, supra note 56, at 1. A study conducted by the Law Enforcement Assist-
ance Administration for 1973 indicated that Detroit had the highest violent crime rate 
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This section considers whether the plausible justifications for lax 
enforcement of the CCW statute outweigh the societal costs inherent 
in allowing individuals to carry concealed weapons with relative im-
punity. Upon concluding that they do not, a model of deterrence 
is constructed and used to critique the current sentencing scheme. 
In part ID, a new enforcement scheme is suggested that is more con-
sistent with the teachings of deterrence theories and less susceptible 
to subversion by those administering the criminal' justice system who 
disagree with the societal assessment of the severity of the offense. 
A. Justifications for Leniency 
The two principal reasons for treating the average CCW offender 
leniently are that the offense is "victimless" and that individual inter-
ests in carrying weapons for self-defense mitigate the criminality of 
the act. Neither rationale, however, can withstand examination. 
"Victimless" concealed weapon offenses in the aggregate gen-
erate significant costs, including accidental injuries, homicides, and 
other crimes involving firearms. Most homicides today are products 
of emotional or drunken altercations rather than planned slayings. 61 
A large majority are committed against a friend, relative, lover, or 
spouse of the offender.62 Many result from domestic quarrels. It 
is arguable that, but for the availability of a firearm, many of these 
intentional homicides would not have occurred. Indeed, "[t]he ba-
sic intent of the -[Michigan] legislature as indicated in the concealed 
weapons statute was that weapons should not be carried where they 
might be used to take lives."63 Even clearer costs to society from 
"victimless" concealed weapon offenses are the accidental injuries 
and deaths that result from the presence of firearms. 64 
of all major cities in the United States. N.Y. Times, April 15, 1974, at 1, col. 1 
(late city ed.). 
61. See Zimring, supra note 3, at 723. That article was based on data from 1967 
Chicago police reports. 
62. See id. at 722. Cf. FBI CRIME REPORTS, supra note 57, at 9-10. 
63. People v. Bailey, 10 Mich. App. 636, 639-40, 160 N.W.2d 380, 382 (1968). 
See People v. Clark, 21 Mich. App. 712, 176 N.W.2d 427 (1970); People v. 
Cunningham, 20 Mich. App. 699, 174 N.W.2d 599 (1969). 
64. Whether guns cause violence, contribute to it, or are merely coincidental 
to it has long been debated. After extensive study we find that the availability 
of guns contributes substantially to violence in American society. Firearms, par-
ticularly handguns, facilitate the commission and increase the danger of the most 
violent crimes-assassination, murder, robbery and assault. The widespread 
availability of guns can also increase the level of violence associated with civil 
disorder. Firearms accidents, while they account for only a small percentage 
of all accidents, cause thousands of deaths and injuries each year. 
To EsTABLISH JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 169. 
A 1972 report found that in 1966 there were 23,000 recorded firearm accidents in 
the United States and that the rate of accidental firearm death by region paralleled 
the geographic pattern of firearm ownership. See G. NEWTON & F. ZIMRING, STAFF 
REPORT TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIO-
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Lax enforcement of the CCW statute presumably causes a gen-
eral feeling of immunity from prosecution among present and pro-
spective violators and decreases the likelihood that individuals will 
be deterred from carrying weapons. Of course, the cost to society 
from lax enforcement of the CCW statute probably is not significant 
with regard to persons who commit premeditated crimes, since the 
behavior contemplated by such persons is usually prohibited by a 
statute that has a greater penalty and deterrent effect than does the 
CCW statute. The only ameliorative impact of stricter enforcement 
of the CCW statute against such individuals would be the preventive, 
incapacitative effect of confiscating the weapon and temporarily re-
moving the offender from the street. The cost of treating CCW as 
a low priority offense may be much more dramatic, however, with 
regard to individuals who do not carry weapons with any definite 
criminal purpose in mind. Quite often the motivation of such per-
sons is merely peer group approval. 65 When confronted with emo-
tionally charged situations, they may use weapons to vent their emo-
tions when they would not otherwise have done so had weapons not 
been readily available. 
It would seem, therefore, that there exists a significant danger 
in allowing even· individuals without any premeditated criminal in-
tent to carry firearms. Indeed, findings from a recent study support 
the proposition that, but for the availability of firearms, the number 
of homicides committed in emotionally charged situations would be 
much lower. 66 As more persons carry weapons, a firearm culture 
arises, which in tum encourages others to obtain weapons and in-
creases, -presumably, the frequency of violent firearm crimes. In 
short, CCW violations in the aggregate are far from costless, and lax-
ity in the enforcement of the CCW statute augments those costs. 
The contention that the severity of a CCW violation is mitigated 
by the offender's interest in self-defense is no more forceful in justi-
fying the current lax treatment of CCW cases than is the contention 
that CCW cases are victimless. One obvious flaw in the contention 
is the fact that guns purchased and carried for self-defense are fre-
quently used offensively. Following the riots of 1967, the yearly is-
suance of gun permits in Detroit quadrupled, presumably because 
people felt a greater need to defend themselves. Perhaps as a con-
sequence of this buildup of handguns, between 1965 and 1968 hom-
icides committed with firearms increased 400 per cent ( compared 
to only a 30 per cent increase in homicides committed with other 
LENCE IN AMERICA, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN LIFE 28-41 (1972) 
[hereinafter FIREARMS & VIOLENCE]. 
65. See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCB213-17 (1973). 
66. See Zimring, supra note 3, at 728-35. Zimring reported that "[t]he rate of 
knife deaths per 100 reported knife attacks was less than 1/4 the rate of gun deaths 
per 100 reported gun attacks." Id. at 728 (emphasis omitted). 
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weapons), accidental deaths from firearms tripled, and firearm rob-
beries increased in frequency twice as fast as unarmed robperies. 67 
A second problem with the self-defense contention is that it is 
based on, and in fact sanctions, an exaggerated view of the benefits 
derived from carrying a weapon for self-defense.68 The chance of 
being murdered is slight. To put that chance in perspective, it is 
approximately one fifth as great as the chance of, being killed in an 
auto accident. 69 Moreover, most murders, as indicated above, are 
committed during sudden quarrels with friends, relatives, or lovers. 
In these cases, the victim presumably feels little need for self-pro-
tection and, if carrying a weapon, will often have set it aside. Even 
in cases of premeditated attack or robbery, most attackers move with 
such dispatch that the victim has insufficient time to respond. In 
cases where the victim does have time to react, he will often have 
time to escape or to use other, less deadly means of self-defense. 
And, as a general rule, state laws require that these lesser means 
be employed if possible. 70 
In short, the self-defense justification for lax enforcement of the 
CCW statute is unpersuasive since few situations arise in which an 
individual both has time to use a handgun in self-defense and is le-
gally justified in doing so.71 As the National Commission on the 
Causes and Prevention of Violence concluded in its chapter on fire-
arms: "The evidence is convincing . . . that the armed segment 
of our population is paying a heavy price in accidents and in the 
shooting of family members, friends and acquaintances for whatever 
deterrent effect their possession of self-defense firearms may be pro-
viding."72 
B. A Model.of Deterrence 
The formulation of a sentencing scheme for CCW offenders that 
is more consistent with the underlying purpose of the CCW statute 
may begin with a survey of the acknowledged precepts of deterrence 
theory. The analysis that follows is based upon the model proposed 
by Zimring and Hawkins. 73 Deterrence, the foundation of virtually 
67. To EsTABLISH JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 171. 
68. See Edwards, supra note 1, at 1335. 
69. Id. 
70. See People v. Piper, 112 Mich. 644, 645-46, 71 N:W. 174, 175 (1897). 
71. Deadly force may be used legally in self-defense only as a last resort in order 
to repel an attacker who is realistically threatening to use deadly force. Se.e W. 
LAFAVE &A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAw 392-93 (1972). · 
72. To EsTABLISH JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 175. 
73. F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 65. It is a basic assumption of this 
Note that deterrence is a viable means of crime prevention and that unlawfully 
carrying a firearm can be deterred by proper enforcement of an adequate provision 
prohibiting such behavior. 
632 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:614 
all modem criminal justice systems, r4 is a process whereby some 
harm, loss, deprivation, or pain is threatened for noncompliance with 
specific commands. 75 The degree to' which these threats are effec-
tive in inducing compliance with the commands is determined by the 
response of the threatened audience of potential offenders. 76 
Deterrence theory postulates that behavior can be controlled 
only if the threats employed are adequate and credible. 77 A threat 
is adequate if it is sufficiently stringent and credible if the threatened 
punishment is applied sufficiently often that the potential violators 
know that the punishment will be applied to them. The level of 
threat that is sufficiently adequate and credible to deter varies 
among offenses according to three factors: the degree to which the 
average offender responds to threats and changes in the severity and 
certainty of the threats; the value of the benefit that the offender 
receives, or perceives that he receives, from offending; and the prob-
ability that an offender will be sanctioned for offending. To deter-
mine an appropriate sanction for CCW offenders, these three factors 
need to be examined in detail. 
1. Offender Responsiveness to Threats 
Whether the average offender for a particular type of offense re-
sponds to threats depends, in turn, upon the nature of the offense, 
the context in which it occurs, and the characteristics of the average 
offender. An offender is more likely to respond to threatened sanc-
tions if the behavior he engages in is not a breach of the prevailing 
moral code. 78 Individuals who act in disregard of existing moral 
precepts are subjected to considerable opprobrium. The prospect 
of public condemnation deters most individuals who consider com-
mitting an immoral offense so that only individuals who are anti-so-
cial or who act irrationally or impulsively actually commit the of-
14. Id. at 1; Morris, Impediments to Penal Reform, 33 U. CHI. L. RBV. 627, 631 
(1966). 
75. See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINs, supra note 65, at 91. 
76. Id. At least one empirical study has applied deterrence theory and found that 
crime rates varied inversely with the probability of apprehension and punishment by 
imprisonment and inversely with the length of imprisonment. See Ehrlich, The 
Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law Enforcement, 1 J. LEGAL STUDIES 259, 272 
(1972). 
77. See generally F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 65, at 160-72, 194-209. 
78. See id. at 120-21. Cf. Andenaes, Deterrence and Specific Offenses, 38 U. 
Cm:. L RBV. 537, 553 (1971). Zimring and Hawkins contrast homicide and illegal 
parking to illustrate this point. With regard to homicide, they hypothesize that only 
.5 per cent of those tempted to commit murder are deterred by legal threats while 99 
per cent are restrained because of such factors as a personal abhorrence of killing and 
commitments to religious and ethical value systems. F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, 
supra, at 133. With regard to parking violations, however, they state that only 5 per 
cent of those tempted to violate are restrained by extra-legal considerations, while 80 
per cent are deterred by the possibility that a fine will be imposed. Id. 
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fense. Such individuals are generally least likely to respond to addi-
tional sanctions imposed by a legal system. In contrast, those indi-
viduals who contemplate committing an offense that is morally 
neutral are apt to be constrained only by the prospect of a legal sanc-
tion. Changes in the severity and certainty of the sanction for a 
morally neutral offense are therefore likely to have measurable ef-
fects in terms of the number of individuals who commit the offense. 
In short, offenders committing offenses that are not considered im-
moral are more likely to respond to threatened sanctions than are 
those who commit offenses that are considered immoral. 79 
An offender is also more likely to respond to threatened sanc-
tions if the offense he commits is one commonly committed in an 
unemotional context. Decisions made quickly in response to sudden 
impulses are less susceptible to the influence of legal and extra-legal 
threats than are carefully planned acts.80 Accordingly, offenders 
who commit offenses that require some planning, or that are com-
mitted knowingly and in a rational state of mind, are more likely to 
be influenced by threats of undesirable consequences. 
A final and related factor affecting the responsiveness of an of-
fender to legal sanctions is whether the offender is by nature a ra-
tional decisionmaker. In a detailed analysis, Zimring and Hawkins 
have concluded that an offender is most easily deterred' (1) if he is 
future-oriented rather than present-oriented, (2) if he is pessimistic 
rather than optimistic, (3) if he is a risk avoider rather than a risk 
preferrer, (4) if he is reflective rather than impulsive, and (5) if 
he is normal rather than neurotic. 81 To this list might be added 
whether or not the individual is strongly socialized. 82 
When considered in light of these factors, the average CCW of-
fender appears to be relatively responsive to the threat of sanctions 
and changes in the severity and certainty of sanctions. Because car-
rying a concealed weapon does not, without more, cause injury to 
other persons, it seems likely that CCW is not viewed by most people 
as an immoral offense. Moreover, except in situations where a fire-
arm is negligently left in clothing or in an automobile, it is reasonable 
to assume that carrying the weapon is an intentional act of the of-
79. Zimring and Hawkins conclude that 
where a threatened behavior is considered to be a serious breach of society's 
moral code, the higher rate of compliant behavior on the part of the strongly 
socialized citizen can be attributed mainly to his sense of right and wrong rather 
than to his special sensitivity to the negative aspects of threatened consequences. 
When a threatened behavior is considered a less drastic breach of the moral 
code, his threat sensitivity may play a greater role. 
F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 65, at 120-21. 
80. See id. at 106-08. 
81. See id. at98-111. 
82. See id. at 119-21. Socialization is a nonlegal factor that is probably an 
adequate deterrent for most citizens. 
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fender based on" 'rational' considerations of gain or loss."88 Appli-
cation of the final factor to the average CCW offender is more diffi-
cult because, presumably, CCW offenders differ considerably in their 
personality traits. It is likely, however, that at least some CCW of-
fenders are relatively reflective, future-oriented, risk averse, and 
nonneurotic. 
2. Average Perceived Benefit from Offending 
Whether a threatened sanction is sufficiently adequate and credi-
ble to deter a certain type of conduct also turns on the average of-
fender's perceived benefit from offending.84 The validity of this 
proposition is easily shown by comparing acts of theft and violations 
of parking ordinances. The individual violating a parking ordinance 
generally profits little from his violation. He may save the money 
it would cost to rent a parking space, or the time it would take to 
find a proper place to park. The individual committing a theft gen-
erally benefits or expects to benefit a great deal more from his crim-
inal act. The prospective violator of a parking ordinance usually will 
be deterred by the threat of a small fine. The same sanction, how-
ever, even if certain to be imposed, is unlikely to deter the potential 
violator of a theft statute. 
The perceived benefit that the average CCW offender receives 
from offending varies in value in most cases somewhere between the 
benefit received by the parking ordinance violator and the benefit 
received by the thief. The offender who carries a concealed weapon 
for no particular purpose other than to create a general sense of se-
curity would probably forgo offending in lieu of paying a $100 fine 
or serving any time in jail or prison. The offender who carries a 
weapon out of a clearly perceived need for self-defense may view 
his benefit from offending as being considerably higher. While 
comparisons are difficult, it is probably accurate to assume that the 
average CCW offender benefits somewhat less from his offense than 
does the thief, who receives tangible, monetary benefits, and the in-
dividual committing a crime of violence, who receives appreciable 
psychological benefits. 85 
83. Chambliss, Types of Deviance and the Effectiveness of Legal Sanctions, 1967 
W1s. L. REV. 703, 706-07. 
84. See generally Ehrlich, supra note 76, at 261-63. 
85. The individual who carries a concealed weapon with a fixed criminal design in 
mind probably benefits more from his entire criminal episode than does the CCW 
offender without any definite criminal goal. For purposes of determining what type 
of sanction is adequate to deter CCW offenders, however, it seems appropriate for 
two reasons to consider the benefit received by the offender who carries a weapon 
without design rather than the benefit received by the offender with a particular 
criminal goal in mind. First, the primary purpose of the CCW statute is to deter the 
carrying of weapons that might be used in emotionally charged situations rather than 
to deter weapon-carrying by those individuals with definite designs to commit specific 
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3. Probability of Sanction Imposition 
To be an effective deterrent, a sanction must impose a detriment 
on the offender at least as great as the benefit received by the of-
fender from offending, for if the sanction is less, the offender can 
offend, suffer the sanction, and still register a net gain. If a sanction 
is imposed on every offender, it can be an effective deterrent if it 
is just slightly greater than the benefit received by the average of-
fender from offending. 
If a sanction is not imposed on every offender, however, whether 
because the offender is not apprehended, is not convicted, or re-
ceives lenient judicial treatment, the sanction must be considerably 
greater than the average offender's benefit from offending to serve 
as a deterrent. 86 In deciding whether to offend, a rational offender 
discounts the threatened sanction by the probability that it will be 
imposed. To use a simple example, assume an offender benefits 
$5 from offending. A $10 sanction will deter hlm if it is certain to be 
imposed. If the sanction is imposed on only one fifth of all offend-
ers, however, the offender will view his expected sanction as being 
only $2 and will not be deterred. Accordingly, for a sanction to be 
an effective deterrent it must be greater than the average offender's 
benefit from offending after being discounted by the probability of 
its imposition. 
Presumably, most CCW offenders are not apprehended because 
CCW is a possessory crime that is extremely difficult to detect.87 
Thus, a sanction must be considerably larger than ,the average CCW 
offender's benefit from offending if it is to deter with any degree 
of effectiveness. The sanction must be larger still if, as is apparently 
true at present, many CCW offenders have the charges against them 
dismissed. If an appreciable proportion of apprehended offenders 
are released without being legally sanctioned, potential offenders 
will further discount the severity of the sanction in deciding whether 
to offend because they will factor in the prospect of having charges 
against them dropped. 
Before proceeding, it seems .appropriate to summarize the deter-
rence concepts just discussed. The deterrence function of a partic-
ular statute is implemented only if the sanction imposed on those 
who violate the statute is sufficiently adequate and credible to deter 
potential offenders. Whether a threatened sanction is adequate and 
credible turns on the responsiveness of the potential offender to 
violent crimes. Deterrence of the latter type of activity is a task properly left to the 
substantive statute proscribing the particular. crime in which the CCW offender 
intends to engage. Second, the sanction for violation of the CCW statute would be 
well above the adequacy level if it were set at the level at which those intending to 
commit violent crimes would be deterred. 
86. See generally Ehrlich, supra note 76, at 265-67. 
87. See note 30 supra. 
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threats, on the average offender's benefit or perceived benefit from 
offending, and on the probability that an individual committing the 
offense will be sanctioned. The responsiveness of CCW offenders to 
threats appears to vary, but in general is probably high compared 
to those who commit violent crimes. The average CCW offender's 
perceived benefit from offending is significant (particularly for of-
fenders with clearly felt needs to protect themselves), but in most 
cases is probably much less than the benefit received by the individ-
ual who commits a crime of violence or theft. Finally, the chance 
that a CCW offender will be apprehended is slight. And, currently, 
slightly over half of those individuals apprehended for carrying a 
concealed weapon without a license are released without having a 
legal sanction imposed. Because of the ease with which police can 
in most cases determine whether an apprehended individual has 
committed the offense, most of the individuals released, presumably, 
were offenders. 
Before attempting to use these conclusions to construct a sen-
tencing scheme, it seems beneficial to critique the assumption that 
violations of the Michigan CCW statute should be punished, if at all, 
only by fine, probation, or both. As the data in part I indicate, this 
assumption currently prevails among those charged with the en-
forcement of the criminal justice system in Detroit. 
C. The Deterrent Impact of Fines and Probation 
An individual convicted of a criminal offense is subjected to a 
varying amount of public condemnation, depending on the type of 
the offense, the severity of the sentence, and the social class of the 
offender. This condemnation is part of the sanction for committing 
an offense and must be taken into account in determining whether 
a particular legal sanction is sufficient to deter potential offenders. 
It is the sum of the legal and extra-legal sanctions that the potential 
offender will consider in deciding whether to offend. 
Because CCW is a morally neutral offense, the opprobrium asso-
ciated with a conviction probably varies considerably as the severity 
of the sentence varies. Thus, if an individual convicted of CCW 
receives a suspended sentence or a small fine, his criminal act will 
probably be viewed as a minor infraction, and he will accordingly 
not be subjected to considerable condemnation. If the offender re-
ceives a more severe sentence, society may conclude that his criminal 
behavior has been more significant and may consequently condemn 
him to a greater extent. If an offender is imprisoned, the condem-
nation takes on a new dimension because of the severe stigma that 
arises from the mere fact of imprisonment. 88 
88. See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 65, at 177-78. 
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Because it triggers little public condemnation, a fine is a rela-
tively ineffective sanction for the commission of a morally neutral 
offense. If an offense not inherently immoral is regularly punished 
only by a fine, "both the offender and the authorities may come to 
view the fine as the 'price'" of engaging in the unlawful behavior.89 
Thus, those who pay the price often feel no moral contriteness from 
having committed the offense, and those who coUect the fine often 
attach less moral significance to the offense than if other forms of 
punishment had been used.90 In a recent study conducted by the 
Arizona State Legislature Criminal Code Revision Commission, a 
cross-section of a community was polled .to ascertain what aspects 
of the criminal law system posed the greatest threats to them. Out 
of sixteen possible responses, the threat of a fine ranked fifteenth, 
the threat of probation ranked eleventh, and the threat of incarcera-
tion, third. 91 In short, the commission of a morally neutral offense 
that is punished solely by a fine engenders few extra-legal sanctions. 
Consequently, the fine must be large in amount to deter potential 
offenders effectively. 
T-he relative ineffectiveness of a fine as a sanction is com-
pounded by the fact that the deterrent effect of a fine varies accord-
ing to the financial means of the potential offender. 92 A fine may 
have little deterrent effect on indigents both because indigents often 
fail to pay fines and because bench warrants generally are not issued 
for failure to pay a fine. 93 A small fine may have its greatest effect 
on individuals in low income categories. A larger fine may not deter 
such individuals to a greater extent because they will be unable to 
pay it. Only a substantial fine is apt to have much of a deterrent 
effect on wealthy offenders. 
In light of the characteristics of the CCW offense and CCW of-
fenders, and in light of the problems with using a fine as a deterrent, 
it is reasonably clear that a fine alone cannot adequately deter the 
commission of CCW offenses. Because CCW is a relatively neutral 
offense in moral terms, extra-legal sanctions can be virtually ignored 
in determining the level at which the fine must be set in order to 
deter effectively.94 To deter, therefore, a fine must be set so that 
when discounted by the probability of imposition it exceeds the aver-
89. Id. at 176. 
90. Id. 
91. Arizona State Legislature Criminal Code Revision Commn., Criminal Justice 
System Research 230a (n.d.). This study began in 1974. 
92. See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 65, at 178. 
93. Boyle Interview, supra note 12. 
94. There will of course be some potential offenders deterred by the extra-legal 
sanctions flowing from a CCW conviction. But most potential offenders are probably 
those who contemplate committing the offense and whose moral beliefs do not bar 
them from doing so. 
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age offender's benefit from offending.95 While, as noted above, the 
average CCW offender's perceived benefit from offending varies, it 
is far from de minimis. For purposes of anlysis, that value can be 
conservatively set at $100 per year. The chances of nonapprehen-
sion are very high because CCW is a possessory crime that is difficult 
to detect. Accordingly, we can estimate that roughly 10 per cent 
of those individuals who carry a concealed weapon without a license 
at some time during the year are apprehended. 
The above model of deterrence suggests, using these figures, 
that the average CCW offender would be deterred from committing 
CCW during the course of a year by the prospect of a $1000 fine.90 
This calculation assumes, however, that the average offender is com-
pletely rational in deciding whether to offend and that all offenders 
apprehended are sanctioned. Because neither of these assumptions 
is true, the $1000 figure must be raised even higher; in the absence 
of concrete data, a figure of $2000 can be used. But there are fur-
ther problems. To state that the average offender would be de-
terred by a $2000 fine means only -that half of the potential offenders 
would be deterred by ·the fine and half would not. The half that 
would not be deterred would probably include those potential of-
fenders who are the best off financially, since many such potential 
offenders would not accept $100 in lieu of offending, and since such 
offenders are probably apprehended less frequently than average. 
The most significant problem with a $2000 fine is that indigent 
and low-income offenders will be unable to pay it and may therefore 
not be deterred by it at all: A potential offender who can pay no 
more than $200 will be deterred by the prospect of a $2000 fine 
little more than by the prospect of a $200 fine. If that offender 
benefits $100 from offending per year, he will be deterred by a fine 
only if he faces a 50 per cent chance of being apprehended and sanc-
tioned in a given year. If his chance of being sanctioned is only 
10 per cent, however, it may be that no fine will deter him because 
he will pay only $200 no matter what the amount of the fine. More 
generally, it seems true that most potential CCW offenders who can-
not pay a fine of $2000 will not be deterred by a fine of any size. 
Many if not most CCW offenders are presumably in this category.07 
95. According to Zimring and Hawkins, three conditions must be met for a fine to 
serve its purpose adequately: "First, the fine must be at least sufficient to outweigh 
the value of the behavior . . . . Second, it must be sufficient to allow for the fact 
that, in considering the present value of the prospect of future loss, a discount is 
commonly implicit in the postponement of the consequences. Third, it must be 
sufficient to offset the perceived chances of nonapprehension." F. ZIMRIN0 & G. 
HAWKINS, supra note 65, at 176. 
96. Actual fines imposed in the CCW cases studied ranged from less than $100 to 
$500. See note 48 supra. 
97. There are, however, no public records on the extent to which fines are 
actually paid. 
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In sum, a $2000 fine for violation of the CCW statute would prob-
ably deter fewer than half of the potential offenders. A larger fine 
would add to the number deterred, but it would not effectively deter 
the large number of CCW offenders who are indigents or in low-
income categories, who act irrationally, or who carry a weapon out 
of a strongly perceived need for self-defense. 
Probation is probably somewhat more effective than a fine in 
terms of its deterrent impact, but it is still apt to be insufficient to 
stem the rise in firearm-related felonies committed in emotionally 
charged situations. The increased efficacy of probation stems first 
from the fact that a more deleterious stigma attaches to those placed 
on probation than to those simply fined and second from the fact 
that probation affects indigent and low-income offenders to a greater 
extent than does a fine. But the opprobrium engendered by the im-
position of probation is still relatively slight when the offense com-
mitted is one, like CCW, accompanied by no real overtones of im-
morality. ,Moreover, the adverse impact of probation in terms of de-
privation of liberty and invasion of privacy is minimal for cooperative 
offenders.98 Generally, the imposition of probation warns an of-
fender that more serious sanctions will be imposed for further viola-
tions. For CCW offenders this warning is currently weakened by the 
fact that those convicted of CCW who have prior criminal records 
are not subjected to more serious legal sanctions. 
Although generalizations in the area of deterrence are difficult 
to make, it is probably true that the discounted threat of probation 
operates as an effective deterrent only against those potential CCW 
offenders who view a criminal conviction of any sort as imposing un-
acceptable social costs and who rationally act upon that view. 
ill. A PROPOSED SENTENCING SCHEME 
The principal shortcoming of the current sentencing pattern of 
CCW offenders is that it inadequately triggers the extra-legal sanc-
tions that could be brought to bear upon CCW offenders. A second 
shortcoming is that a low proportion of apprehended offenders are 
legally sanctioned, which means in tum that a higher legal sanction 
must be imposed on those actually sanctioned to deter potential of-
fenders. 
A sentencing scheme that would materially mitigate these short-
comings without punishing offenders unduly is a scheme requiring 
the imposition of a five-day minimum jail sentence on all individuals 
convicted of CCW or attempted CCW.99 A five-day jail term, from 
98. See generally S. KRANrz, supra note 53, at 46-54. 
99. The Massachusetts CCW statute was amended in 1974 to provide for a one-
year mandatory minimum sentence. MASS. GEN. 1.Aws ANN. ch. 269, § lO(a) (Supp. 
1974). The general impact of this change has not yet been ascertained, but one 
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the offender's point of view, involves the "loss of freedom to act and 
make choices, deprivation of the opportunity to make money, sexual 
deprivation, invasion of privacy, rigid discipline, and living conditions 
far below the ordinary standards of society."100 The threat of incar-
ceration operates with equal effectiveness for both the rich and the 
poor101 and should in general deter most potential CCW offenders. 
The principal attribute of such a sentencing scheme is that it 
would make better use of extra-legal sanctions than does the current 
sentencing pattern. Incarceration, more than other forms of punish-
ment, generally carries with it significant measures of social reproba-
1tion. As Zimring has remarked: "Imprisonment involves demo-
tion to the socially depressed and disapproved status of prisoner or 
convict, and the label is likely to remain longer than the sentence 
of imprisonment."102 Thus, the infamy flowing from imprisonment 
is likely to be much greater than the infamy flowing from a fine or 
probation; this phenomenon has the two-fold beneficial effect of in-
creasing the extra-legal sanctions on the offender and sharpening 
public awareness of the seriousness of the offense. 
A mandatory jail sentence, if conscientiously applied by judges 
to all CCW and attempted CCW offenders, would increase the num-
ber of offenders punished and thereby increase the deterrent effect 
of the statute. Moreover, it would do so without increasing 
the punishment imposed on those offenders who currently re-
ceive fairly stiff punishments. A further advantage of the five-
result was a marked increase in firearm registration. The first day the statute was in 
effect, over 700 firearms were registered in Boston alone. Boston Globe, April 1, 
1975, at 1. 
The Michigan legislature has recently enacted a statute, Enrolled House Bill No, 
5073, 78th Legislature (1976), to add the following section to MICH. COMP, LAws ch. 
750: 
Sec. 227b. (1) A person who carries or has in his possession a firearm at 
the time he commits or attempts to commit a felony, except the violation of sec-
tion 227 or section 227a, is guilty of a felony, and shall be imprisoned for 2 
years. Upon a second conviction under this section, the person shall be impris-
oned for 5 years. Upon a third subsequent conviction under this section, the 
person shall be imprisoned for 10 years. 
(2) The term of imprisonment prescribed by this section shall be in addi-
tion to the sentence imposed for the conviction of the felony or the attempt to 
commit the felony, and shall be served consecutively with and preceding any 
term of imprisonment imposed for the conviction of the felony or attempt to 
commit the felony. 
(3) The term of imprisonment imposed under this section shall not be sus-
pended. The person subject to the sentence mandated by this section shall not 
be eligible for parole or probation during the mandatory term imposed pursuant 
to subsection (1). 
The act becomes effective on Jan. 1, 1977. Enrolled House Bill No. 5073, § 2. It 
should be noted that the CCW felony, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.227 (Supp. 
1975), is specifically excluded from the mandatory sentence imposed by this bill. 
100. F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 65, at 183. 
101. Id. at 185. 
102. Id. at 190. See J. MARTIN, OFFENDERS AS EMPLOYEES 39 (1962); McSally, 
Finding Jobs for Released Offenders, 24 FED, PROBATION 12, 13 (1960). 
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day minimum sentence is that it would encourage police to arrest 
offenders and encourage prosecutors to pursue cases they might oth-
erwise have dismissed. Many CCW offenders do not need a heavy 
sentence, yet do need to be punished in some noteworthy, exemplary 
manner. If a policeman or prosecutor realizes that judges will deal 
with such offenders by either sentencing them severely or dismissing 
the charges against them, the policeman or prosecutor may decide 
not to commence the case. If judges sentence such offenders to five 
days in jail as a general practice, police and prosecutors who realize 
the need to combat firearm-related felonies might be encouraged to 
follow through on otherwise marginal cases. 
Various commentators since the beginning of the nineteenth cen-
tury have adopted the view that all crime would be eliminated if pun-
ishment could be made more certain.103 One commentator has ar-
gued that "[t]he effectiveness of a deterrent is derived less from 
its severity than from its certainty."104 While these contentions are 
difficult to prove or disprove, a number of recent empirical studies 
do indicate that the certainty of some punishment is capable of ex-
erting at least a mild impact on the crime.105 Ehrlich has found sup-
port for his thesis that "offenders, as a group, respond to opportuni-
ties (cost and gains) available to them in legitimate and criminal ac-
tivities in much the same way that those engaged in strictly legitimate 
activities do as a group."106 He asserts that prison sentences deter 
crime because they increase the cost of crime.107 Mandatory min-
imum sentences increase that deterrent effect when employed in 
lieu of other measures taken against the criminal that cost him less. 
Sociologists ·have "found that fear at relatively low levels may pro-
duce increased attitude changes, 108 whereas high levels of fear may 
increase resistance to persuasion."109 The fear of a five-day impris-
onment term should suffice to deter most prospective violators with-
out causing a "forbidden fruit" effect. 
103. See Radzinowicz, Preface to F. MCCLINTOCK & E. GIBSON, ROBBERY IN 
LoNDON, at vii, x (1961), cited in F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 65, at 161. 
104. W. Temple, Ethics of Penal Action 33 (1934), cited in F. ZIMRING & G. 
HAWKINS, supra note 65, at 161. 
105. See Antunes & Hunt, The Impact of Certainty and Severity of Punishment 
on Levels of Crime in the American States: An Extended Analysis, 64 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMIN. 486, 489 (1973); Gray & Martin, Punishment and Deterrence: Another 
Analysis of Gibbs' Data, 50 Soc. Ser. Q. 389, 394 (1969). 
106. Ehrlich, supra note 76, at 274. 
107. Id. at 262. 
108. See Berkowitz & Cottingham, The Interest Value and Relevance of Fear 
Arousing Communication, 60 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCH. 37, 42 (1960), cited in F. 
ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 65, at 152. 
109. F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 65, at 152, citing Janis & Terwilliger, 
An Experimental Study of Psychological Resistances to Fear Arousing Communica-
tions 65 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCH. 403-10 (1967). 
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First offenders would be most affected by the mandatory mini-
mum sentence. The experience of five days in prison should be suf-
ficiently unpleasant to raise severe doubts in the offender's mind 
about further criminal activity. At the same time, the sentence 
should be sufficiently brief that many of the negative aspects of in-
carceration would not have had an opportunity to criminalize the in-
dividual.110 
The five-day jail sentence is, of course, only a minimum. Of-
fenders with prior criminal records may require a more severe sanc-
tion, which judges remain free to impose up to the statutory maxi-
mums.111 
The credibility of a sanction turns not only on the certainty with 
which it is imposed but also on the effectiveness of the communica-
tion of the threat to the public.112 It seems reasonable to assume 
that some people may be unaware of the illegality of certain be-
havior, such as carrying a concealed weapon, that is not inherently 
immoral. At a minimum, potential offenders must be aware that 
the behavior is prohibited and that violations may be punished. 
It therefore might prove useful for those who administer the 
criminal justice system in Detroit to initiate a campaign to educate 
the public about the costs and benefits associated with firearm own-
ership. Information could be furnished concerning gun registration, 
requirements for obtaining a permit to carry a concealed weapon, 
and hunting regulations. Yearly statistics could be provided point-
ing out the number of criminal homicides, accidents, and suicides 
committed with firearms. Further, the various criminal statutes, in-
cluding the CCW statute, could be set forth and discussed. It might 
also be possible to construct reminders of the various prohibitions 
and penalties along the streets in high-crime areas. A recent cam-
paign in Michigan to post signs that read "Drunk drivers go to jail"118 
is an example of this possibility. Use of local billboards, as well as 
posting signs in government buildings, would help focus local atten-
tion on the firearm problem.114 
110. See U.S. TASK FORCE ON CORRECTIONS, THE PRESIDENT'S COMMN. ON LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECI10NS 
46-47 (1967). 
111. Of those defendants convicted of CCW, 53.5 per cent had a prior record, 
including 36.1 per cent with prior felonies. See TABLE 6 supra. MICH. COMP. LAws 
§ 769.10 (1970) provides that a person convicted of a second felony may be 
sentenced to a term up to one and one-half times longer than the normal penalty for 
that felony. The decision whether to use this provision is within the sole discretion 
of the prosecutor. See People v. Stratton, 13 Mich. App. 350, 356, 164 N.W.2d 555, 
558 (1968). The Detroit prosecutor's office has made only limited use of the statute. 
Boyle Interview, supra note 12. Increased use of this statute could be one way to 
deter chronic CCW offenders. 
112. See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINs, supra note 65, at 141-42. 
113. See id. at 149. 
114. Zimring and Hawkins conclude, "Extensive publicity and increased severity 
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The statistics in part I suggest that the low rate of sanctioning 
of CCW offenders is partially attributable to the attitudes of the trial 
judges. Mandatory minimum sentences would reduce the sentenc-
ing discretion of the recorder's court bench. Controls should also 
be placed on the bench to prevent the dismissal of meritorious cases, 
whether for docket clearing purposes or because the judge questions 
the wisdom of the CCW statute. Oearly, .the judiciary must have 
unfettered discretion in determining whether sufficient probable 
cause exists to warrant a bind-over at the preliminary examination 
stage. Further, it is the duty of the judge to determine whether the 
defendant's constitutional rights have been violated. A requirement 
that the judge state on the record his or her reasons for dismissing 
the case (including, where appropriate, findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law) might aid in eliminating clearly unreasonable dismis-
sals. Plea bargaining abuses should be curtailed by requiring adher-
ence to Genesee I & II and the Michigan court rules. 
Only if CCW legislation is adequately enforced can headway be 
made in halting the further development of a firearm culture in De-
troit and other major cities. In the absence of effective enforce-
ment, the number of firearms owned and carried is likely to in-
crease, 115 with a consequent increase in the incidence of firearm-
related crimes. Increased crime is apt to solidify nascent fears and 
encourage persons to purchase weapons for self-defense, which may 
in turn further increase the crime rate. 
If a relatively strong sanction is imposed on violators with suffi-
cient frequency, many ostensibly law abiding citizens will conclude 
,that the costs of gun ownership outweigh the benefits and will give 
up their guns. This first step must be taken if the rise in firearm-
related felonies, particularly those committed in emotionally charged 
settings, is to be combatted with any degree of effectiveness. 
of sanctions may conjointly achieve substantial marginal general deterrence." Id. at 
157. 
115. For instance, the number of firearms in the city of Detroit quadrupled 
between 1965 and 1969. Edwards, supra note 1, at 1341. 
